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EXPERIMENT, INTERRUPTED:
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
VERSUS ACCESS TO JUSTICE
MICHELE COTTON 1
I. THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO CIVIL JUSTICE AND
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
According to the 2011 report of the World Justice Project, the
United States ranks twentieth out of twenty-three "high-in-
come" countries in the ability of people to access and afford civil
courts.2 The only countries that ranked lower were Poland, Cro-
atia, and Italy.3 Hardly ignorant of the difficulties that Ameri-
cans with civil legal problems face, the U.S. Department of
Justice (DOJ) began an Access to Justice Initiative in March
2010 in an attempt to address what it describes as our "access-
to-justice crisis." 4
The problem of access to civil justice is of course the most
serious for low-income persons, who are at a particular disad-
vantage in the legal marketplace. In the U.S., most low-income
people with civil legal problems handle them on their own or
1 Assistant Professor and Director, Legal and Ethical Studies Program, Uni-
versity of Baltimore Yale Gordon College of Arts and Sciences; A.B., The
College of William and Mary, 1981; Ph.D., Brandeis University, 1985; J.D.,
New York University School of Law, 1988; Ed.M., Harvard Graduate School
of Education, 2005. The author would like to thank research assistant Sean
O'Donnell and Professors David Reiss and Russell Engler for their helpful
suggestions and comments on a draft of this Article.
2 Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, and Alejandro Ponce, World Jus-
tice Project Rule of Law Index 111, 114 (2011), http://worldjusticeproject.org/
sites/default/files/wjproli20ll-0.pdf.
3 Id.
4 See The United States Department of Justice, Access to Justice Initiative
(A TJ), http://www.justice.gov/atj/index.html.
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not at all.5 Although some free and pro bono lawyers are availa-
ble, demand for assistance substantially exceeds supply.6 The
result is not simply that low-income people have less access to
justice but also, given their greater economic and social vulnera-
bility, that the consequences of lack of access are more
significant.
The two most commonly-proposed strategies for improving
the situation are "mandatory pro bono" requirements for law-
yers and a "civil Gideon" rule or ruling that would mandate le-
gal representation for persons with civil cases (just as the
Supreme Court's Gideon ruling did for criminal cases).7 How-
ever, neither of these options is likely to become a reality any-
time soon. Although mandatory pro bono requirements have
often been recommended, no State has adopted them, and ex-
isting ethical rules leave pro bono contributions aspirational.8
The President and Chief Executive Officer of the Pro Bono In-
stitute recently asked in the National Law Journal, "Is it time
for mandatory pro bono?" Her answer, "despite the unparal-
leled dimensions of the current crisis, is not yet."9 Similarly, a
civil Gideon ruling or rule has also yet to be put into effect in
any jurisdiction, and the U.S. Supreme Court recently rejected
the latest effort to establish a constitutional basis for appoint-
5 See, e.g., American Bar Association Fund for Justice and Education, Legal
Needs and Civil Justice: A Survey of Americans (1996); District of Columbia
Access to Justice Commission, Justice for All?: An Examination of the Civil
Legal Needs of the District of Columbia's Low-Income Community, Execu-
tive Summary pp. 7, 9 (Oct. 2008) (more than 98% of respondents in pater-
nity and child support cases proceeded pro se; 97% of defendants in
landlord-tenant cases proceeded pro se; 95% of public benefits recipients ap-
peared unrepresented at their hearings).
6 See, e.g., Legal Services Corporation, Documenting the Justice Gap in
America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-Income Americans
(2005).
7 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 See ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 6.1.
9 Esther F Lardent, Is it Time for Mandatory Pro Bono? THE NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL (Sep. 13, 2011), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/Pub
ArticlePrinterFriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1202514274834&slreturn=l.
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EXPERIMENT, INTERRUPTED
ment of counsel in civil cases.' 0 Finding the funding to pay for
lawyers to handle civil cases for those who cannot afford them
will in any event be difficult to accomplish in the current fiscal
and political environment.
Another idea sometimes proposed to improve access to jus-
tice is allowing trained nonlawyers to assist low-income persons
with their civil legal problems. Such an approach would be con-
siderably less expensive than civil Gideon and would not require
the financial sacrifice from lawyers of mandatory pro bono. It
would expand the "pie" of available resources and permit enti-
ties such as community groups and academic institutions to be
tapped as a potential source of free legal services to low-income
persons. Indeed, it might make sense for simpler, "lower-
stakes" legal problems to receive the attention of nonlawyers
with some basic legal knowledge and access to relevant informa-
tion, rather than expend the scarce and valuable resource of a
lawyer's time on such matters. Nonlawyer assistance thus could
be a cost-effective and appropriate partial solution to the civil
access to justice problem.
The main obstacle to pursuing this solution is the State laws
against the unauthorized practice of law (UPL) that prevail in
most jurisdictions. Most States define the practice of law so
broadly" or vaguely12 that it is difficult for nonlawyers to assist
10 Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507 (2011) (no right to counsel in case in-
volving civil contempt proceedings against parent who failed to abide by
child support order).
11 Definitions include broad statutory and judge-made rules including, for
example: "[a]ny action taken for others in any matter connected with the
law," GA. CODE ANN §5-19-50(6) (2011); "the giving of advice or rendition of
any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation when the giving of such
advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal
knowledge or skill," Continental Cas. Co. v. Cuda, 715 N.E.2d 663 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1999), citing People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 51
(1949); "performing any legal service for any other person, firm or corpora-
tion, with or without compensation, . . .or assisting by advice, counsel, or
otherwise in any legal work; and to advise or give opinion upon the legal
rights of any person, firm or corporation . . .," N.C. §84-2.1; "directing and
Volume 5, Number 2 Spring 2012
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people with legal problems without being accused of violating
laws against UPL. Nonetheless, because the problem of access
to justice is so dire and because other potential solutions are
unlikely to be achieved in the near future and likely to be insuf-
ficient even if achieved, nonlawyer assistance remains an impor-
tant option to consider. For example, in 1998, the Fordham
University School of Law Conference on the Delivery of Legal
Services to Low-income Persons made a number of recommen-
dations supporting the greater involvement of nonlawyers in the
provision of legal services.13 Indeed, the conference participants
concluded that "experimentation with nonlawyer advocacy was
managing the enforcement of legal claims and the establishment of the legal
rights of others, where it is necessary to form and to act upon opinions as to
what those rights are and as to the legal methods which must be adopted to
enforce them, the practice of giving or furnishing legal advice as to such
rights and methods and the practice, as an occupation, of drafting documents
by which such rights are created, modified, surrendered or secured. . .," Mas-
sachusetts Conveyancers Ass'n, Inc. v. Colonial Title & Escrow, Inc., 2001 WL
669280 (Mass. 2001), citing Matter of Shoe Manufacturers Protective Associa-
tion, 295 Mass. 369, 372 (1936). A listing of State definitions, though not
completely up to date, may be found at http://www.americanbar.org/content/
damlaba/migrated/cpr/model-deflmodel def statutes.authcheckdam.pdf.
12 Courts have frequently acknowledged the vagueness of their State's defi-
nition. See, e.g., Pope v. Savings Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1351
(9th Cir. 1988) (definition of practice of law "elusive of precise definition");
Francorp, Inc. v. Siebert, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (N.D. Ill. 2002) ("Illinois
courts have not adopted a precise definition of 'practice of law.'.... [T]he line
between consulting and practicing is sometimes a blurry one." (citations
omitted); In re Mothershed, 2001 Ariz. LEXIS 63, 12 ("no clear definition of
'practice of law"' in Arizona); Lukas v. Bar Assoc. of Montgomery County,
Inc., 35 Md. App. 442, 443; 371 A.2d 669 (1977) ("We shall not endeavor to
formulate a precise definition of the practice of law."); Dressel v. Ameribank,
468 Mich. 557, 569; 664 N.W.2d 151 (2003) (Weaver, J., concurring) ("This
Court has long held that the 'practice of law' defies precise definition"); West
Va. State Bar v. Earley, 144 W. Va. 504, 518; 109 S.E.2d 420 (1959) ("it is
generally recognized that it is extremely difficult, perhaps impossible, to for-
mulate a precise and completely comprehensive definition of the practice of
law or to prescribe limits to the scope of that activity").
13 See Recommendations of the Conference on the Delivery of Legal Services
to Low-income Persons, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1751, 1759-74 (1999).
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185 EXPERIMENT, INTERRUPTED
necessary in light of the unmet civil legal needs of low-income
people."14
But the question is how such experiments can even happen,
given the chilling nature of UPL restrictions. To provide some
insight into the difficulties involved, this Article does a post-
mortem on a recent failed experiment in Maryland that at-
tempted to use nonlawyers to provide free assistance to low-in-
come persons with civil legal problems. Although the
experiment was designed to conform to Maryland law on UPL,
it still did not get very far. The Article also considers possible
approaches for future experiments with nonlawyer assistance, in
light of this experience. Although every State has its own
unique situation, most States resemble Maryland in having sub-
stantial unmet legal needs and expansive laws against UPL.
Thus, the lessons from this Maryland experiment are more gen-
erally applicable, and can serve as a guide to other efforts to
explore this option to improve access to justice.
II. THE POTENTIAL OF NONLAWYER ASSISTANCE
The idea that trained nonlawyers might help improve access
to justice has attracted some prominent advocates. For exam-
ple, over forty years ago, Supreme Court Justice William 0.
Douglas observed:
It may well be that until the goal of free legal assis-
tance to the indigent in all areas of the law is
achieved, the poor are not harmed by well-mean-
ing, charitable assistance of laymen. On the con-
trary, for the majority of indigents, who are not so
fortunate to be served by neighborhood legal of-
14 Id. at 1762-63 ("The Group opined that it was unacceptable to sacrifice
quality of access for quantity of access. Nonetheless, we felt that experimen-
tation with nonlawyer advocacy was necessary in light of the unmet civil legal
needs of low-income people.").
Volume 5, Number 2 Spring 2012
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fices, lay assistance may be the only hope for
achieving equal justice at this time.15
Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School promoted
the idea more recently. He pointed out to the attendees at the
2010 American Bar Association Pro Bono Publico Awards
Luncheon that "even if all the lawyers in this room rededicated
themselves to pro bono work, and we increased funding for civil
legal services five-fold, we still wouldn't have enough lawyers to
meet all the needs of the poor and working class."'16 He sug-
gested that nonlawyers be given more of an ability to provide
legal services - even as he recognized that lawyers might be re-
luctant to consider that prospect:
Many outside this room view lawyers as the prob-
lem, believing that they don't want to see others
helping with even the simplest and most straight-
forward legal issue, because that would cut into
their business. My advice: prove them wrong.
Work with your state bar associations to make
sure that rules of professional practice more realis-
tically reflect the requirements for meeting peo-
ple's desperate need for legal help - help that can
come from those with background and training
different from our own.' 7
The organized bar and the courts generally take the position
that allowing nonlawyers more of a role would be harmful to
consumers.' 8 However, this conclusion has been disputed.
David Vladeck, former Professor at Georgetown Law School
15 Hacking v. Arizona, 389 U.S. 143, 152 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (dis-
sent to the granting of the motion to dismiss for lack of a federal question).
16 Laurence H. Tribe, Senior Counselor for Access to Justice, Speaks at the
ABA Pro Bono Publico Awards Luncheon (August 9, 2010) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.justice.gov/atj/opa/pr/speeches/2Ol0/atj-speech-100809.
html).
17 Id.
18 See In re Arons 756 A.2d 867(Del. 2000), which involved special education
consultants who had been serving as representatives to parents in Individuals
Volume 5, Number 2 Spring 2012
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185 EXPERIMENT, INTERRUPTED
and current Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection at
the Federal Trade Commission, has remarked:
[T]he Bar has refused to address the problem [of
unmet needs] by easing restrictions on non-lawyer
practice. Concerns about the quality of lay assis-
tance cannot be the real answer because study af-
ter study has shown that trained lay advocates can
effectively represent people in standardized legal
proceedings - and even in complex ones when
they are specially trained. The ABA commis-
sioned a blue ribbon panel to study the merits of
relaxing restrictions on lay advocacy, and that
panel strongly recommended that the reins be
eased considerably. But the ABA House of Dele-
gates has refused to act on these recommenda-
tions.... 19
Professor Deborah Rhode at Stanford Law School has taken
a similar position, concluding that "virtually no experts believe
that current prohibitions [on nonlawyer assistance] make sense"
and noting that "[c]omparative research finds that ... lay spe-
cialists can perform as effectively as attorneys. In the one re-
ported survey of consumer satisfaction, nonlawyers rated higher
than lawyers." 20 According to Prof. Rhode, "[a]lmost all of the
scholarly experts and commissions that have studied the issue
[of expanding nonlawyer assistance] have recommended in-
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) administrative hearings. In finding
that such assistance constituted UPL, the court remarked:
This Court does not exercise its inherent authority to regulate
the practice of law for the purpose of protecting the financial
interests of the lawyer. Our role is to insure that the public will
enjoy the representation of individuals who have been found to
possess the necessary skills and training to represent others. Id.
at 874.
19 David C. Vladeck, Hard Choices: Thoughts for New Lawyers, 10 Kan. J.L.
& Pub. Pol'y 351, 356 (2001).
20 Deborah L. Rhode, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LE-
GAL PROFESSION 135-36 (2000).
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creased opportunities for such assistance" but "[a]lmost all of
the major decisions by judges and bar associations have ignored
those recommendations." 21
Notwithstanding UPL restrictions, the reality is that many
people who cannot get a lawyer will receive the assistance of
nonlawyers. Their neighbors, co-workers, friends and/or family
will do the best they can to help. This low-quality informal assis-
tance that unrepresented low-income people get goes on unim-
peded, because it is practically beyond the reach of UPL
restrictions.22 But better-quality assistance from trained
nonlawyers is not available, because it is any organized and for-
mal provision of assistance that is most likely to be prosecuted
as UPL.23 The consequence of insisting that low-income people
must be assisted by lawyers is generally to ensure that they get
no real help at all - making the perfect the enemy of the good.
By contrast, other countries allow nonlawyers to provide
some kinds of legal services. Professor Gillian Hadfield of Uni-
versity of Southern California's School of Law has argued that
the U.S. could improve access to justice by permitting individu-
als who are not lawyers to provide legal services, as there are in
other countries such as England, Australia and the Nether-
21 Deborah L. Rhode, Symposium: Whatever Happened to Access to Justice?,
42 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 869, 885-86 (2009).
22 See People v. Landlords Professional Services, 215 Cal. App. 3d 1599
(1989), in which the defendant argued that the State's definition of legal ad-
vice would apply "to friends who give opinions or advice about each other's
legal problems." The court responded that "[w]hile it is true the inherent and
necessarily general nature of any definition of legal practice may allow the
formulation of hypothetical situations that render the definition unworkable,
we need not be concerned with such a reductio ad absurdum argument in this
case. Our research has found no case in which one friend was either enjoined
from giving legal advice to a friend or prosecuted for the giving of such ad-
vice." Id. at 1609.
23 See Lawline v. American Bar Association, 956 F.2d 1378, 1381 (7th Cir.
1992), which "use[d] law students, paralegals and lawyers to answer legal
questions from the public without charge over the telephone and to assist
them in representing themselves in routine legal matters," prior to being en-
joined as UPL. Id. at 1382.
Volume 5, Number 2 Spring 2012
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187 EXPERIMENT, INTERRUPTED
lands.24 She notes that "[i]n the U.S., people and businesses
have only one place to go for all their legal help - lawyers who
graduated from an ABA-approved law school," while
"[e]veryone else who offers legal advice is engaged in the unau-
thorized practice of law." 25 Of course, the U.S. does have legal
paraprofessionals, but such persons work under the direct super-
vision of lawyers who remain responsible for their work 26 and
can be disciplined for failing to exercise sufficient control.27 Ac-
cordingly, paraprofessionals only incrementally increase the
availability or affordability of legal services. Professor Hadfield
argues that "[t]he United States urgently needs to expand capac-
ity for non-lawyers to meet the legal needs of ordinary Ameri-
cans in innovative and less costly ways" 28 and "dislodge the idea
that the highest value is to provide a state bar licensed lawyer
from an ABA-accredited school to everyone who needs legal
help."29 Although it may boggle the American legal mind, ac-
cording to Hadfield, "[t]he U.K. has never had an unauthorized
24 Gillian Hadfield, Making Legal Aid More Accessible and Affordable, THE
WASHINGTON POST, March 12, 2010, p. A17.
25 Quoted in David Segal, For Law Schools, a Price to Play the A.B.A.'s
Way, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011.
26 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucr R. 5.3 (2004) (stating "The
definition of the practice of law is established by law and varies from one
jurisdiction to another. Whatever the definition, limiting the practice of law
to members of the bar protects the public against rendition of legal services
by unqualified persons. This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from employing
the services of paraprofessionals and delegating functions to them, so long as
the lawyer supervises the delegated work and retains responsibility for their
work" (emphasis added)).
27 See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Maryland v. Hallmon, 343 Md.
390; 681 A.2d 510 (1996) (attorney subject to professional discipline for insuf-
ficient oversight of a lay assistant handling zoning board hearing, as demon-
strated by the attorney's lack of knowledge of the hearing strategy and
factual details of the case).
28 Hadfield, supra note 24.
29 Quoted in Segal, supra note 25.
Volume 5, Number 2 5prin, 2012
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practice-of-law rule: Anyone may provide legal advice, so long
as he or she doesn't call him- or herself a solicitor."30
Along the same lines, the DOJ and Federal Trade Commis-
sion have been arguing that lawyers' monopoly on legal services
disadvantages consumers. Over the last decade and a half, these
federal agencies have approached a dozen States as well as the
ABA to advocate for narrower definitions of the practice of law
and of what constitutes UPL.31 For example, in 2009, the DOJ
urged the Montana Supreme Court to reject a broad definition
of the practice of law proposed by its Commission on the Unau-
thorized Practice of Law.32 According to the DOJ, such a broad
definition would force the citizens of the State "to hire a lawyer
to provide a host of services where legal expertise should not be
necessary." The letter noted the threat such a law posed to "lay
organizations, advocates, and consumer associations that pro-
vide citizens with information about legal rights and issues and
help them negotiate solutions to problems." The Montana Su-
preme Court subsequently determined that it did not have the
constitutional authority to define the practice of law and dis-
solved its UPL Commission.33 However, that is not to say the
climate for nonlawyers in that State to provide assistance im-
proved; rather, the situation was left ambiguous. Most States
continue to have broad definitions of the practice of law and
broad concepts of UPL that prevent or inhibit the involvement
30 Gillian K. Hadfield, Legal Services Wanted; Lawyers Need Not Apply
(June 28, 2011) (Miller-McCune Research Essay) (available at http://www.
miller-mccune.com/legal-affairs/legal-services-wanted-lawyers-need-not-ap-
ply-32128/).
31 See Advocacy letters and other materials collected available at http://www.
justice.gov/atr/public/comments/commentsstates.htm. (The States approach
includes Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Mon-
tana, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, Virginia and Wisconsin).
32 Id. See letter dated April 17, 2009.
33 In re Dissolving the Comm'n on Unauthorized Practice of Law, 2010 MT
82. See April 20, 2010 Opinion and Order at http://www.montanabar.org/
associations/7121/files/4-20-10%200rder%20dissolving%20UPL%2OComm.
pdf.
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18.9 EXPERIMENT, INTERRUPTED
of nonlawyers in providing assistance to unrepresented
persons.34
The use of trained nonlawyers to provide some forms of legal
assistance is an approach that could expand the availability of
help to low-income persons with legal problems, would be lower
cost than other options, and could provide assistance of suffi-
cient quality (and in most cases better than no assistance at all).
Such use of nonlawyers is an approach that has thoughtful advo-
cates in the legal academic community and in government. But
few experiments in nonlawyer assistance have been attempted
because of the continued obstacle represented by UPL restric-
tions - which, as the attempted experiment in Maryland indi-
cates, can operate as a substantial restraint on innovative
approaches to improving access to justice.
IH. THE EXPERIMENT
Maryland, like most States, has a problem with providing le-
gal assistance to all who need it.35 In Maryland, as elsewhere,
low-income civil litigants lack any right to appointed counsel in
most civil cases, and the majority of low-income persons with
civil legal problems must pursue their legal rights unassisted.36
34 See supra notes 10 and 11.
35 Benjamin L. Cardin & Robert J. Rhudy, Symposium: Expanding Pro
Bono Legal Assistance in Civil Cases to Maryland's Poor, 49 MD. L. REV. 1
(1990) (noted that a 1987 Maryland survey found that the typical low-income
household in Maryland experienced an average of more than three legal
problems each year, and only about 20 percent of these legal needs could be
addressed by existing services); Id. at 5-6; Standing Committee of the Court
of Appeals on Pro Bono Legal Service, State Action Plan and Report 4 (2006)
(available atfcns] http://www.courts.state.md.us/probono/pdfs/stateactionplan
12-18-06.pdf) (noting that in 2004, it was similarly found that 80 percent of
persons seeking assistance from the State's free legal services provider were
not accepted for legal representation).
36 Maryland Access to Justice Commission, Implementing a Civil Right to
Counsel in Maryland 9 (2011) (noting that it has been estimated that each
year about 470,000 low-income persons in Maryland have a civil legal prob-
Volume 5, Number 2
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The State of Maryland is not indifferent to the plight of these
persons. It has been working to try to address the problem
through various strategies, including through its own Access to
Justice Commission. However, none of the sixty-two recom-
mendations in the Maryland Commission's 2009 Interim Report
and Recommendations mention nonlawyer assistance, 37 nor did
its 2010 report give any attention to that option.38 Rather, the
Commission's emphasis has been on obtaining funding to pay
for lawyers to provide representation to low-income persons
who have cases involving "basic human needs" - in other words,
on bringing about the adoption of a version of civil Gideon.39
Achieving this goal is as unlikely in Maryland as it is in other
jurisdictions.40 Mandatory pro bono seems similarly unlikely to
be adopted in Maryland.41 The cost of the Commission's civil
Gideon recommendation - $107 million42 - is a significant im-
pediment. Even if the recommended version of civil Gideon
were implemented in the State, it would leave a great many le-
lem and about 105,000 of those will actually be able to obtain the assistance
of a lawyer).
37 Maryland Access to Justice Commission, Interim Report and Recommen-
dations (2009), available at http://www.mdcourts.gov/mdatjc/pdfs/interimre-
port ll009.pdf.
38 Maryland Access to Justice Commission, Annual Report (2010), available
at http://www.mdcourts.gov/mdatjc/pdfs/annualreport2010.pdf.
39 Implementing, supra note 36.
40 See, e.g., Steven D. Schwinn, Faces of Open Courts and the Civil Right to
Counsel, 37 U. Balt. L. Rev. 21 (2007) (discussing some difficulties with mak-
ing the case for civil Gideon at 23-25).
41 Cardin and Rhudy, supra note 35, at 17, observe that the "MSBA [Mary-
land State Bar Association] leadership opposed a mandatory pro bono rule
until the effects of efforts to expand voluntary pro bono efforts under con-
certed, bar, court, and legal services program cooperation have been tried
and assessed." In 1989, presumably after such assessment, a voluntary re-
cruitment plan was adopted. Deborah Sweet Byrnes and Sharon E. Gold-
smith, The Maryland Judicial Commission on Pro Bono, Report and
Recommendations 8 (2000), http://www.courts.state.md.us/probono/pdfs/pro
bono.pdf. See also Schwinn, supra note 40, at 101-02, recommending a civil
Gideon rule rather than mandatory pro bono.
42 Implementing, supra note 36, at 10.
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191 EXPERIMENT, INTERRUCPTED
gal problems unaddressed. As is the case with many such pro-
posals,4 3 it would only apply to the most serious of civil legal
matters.
This is the context in which the effort was recently undertaken
by the Legal and Ethical Studies (LEST) masters degree pro-
gram at the University of Baltimore in Maryland to expand ac-
cess to civil justice by using nonlawyers to assist low-income
persons with certain legal problems. The graduate students in
the LEST program are not lawyers or law students, nor are they
engaged in the professional study of law. Rather, they study the
legal system from a humanistic perspective. 44 Although lacking
the screening and intensive training of law students, the students
in the LEST program nonetheless are at least graduate students
who have some basic legal knowledge and the ability to do legal
research. The LEST project proposed to use these students to
assist low-income people in Baltimore City who had been
turned away for representation by a local legal services pro-
vider, and who were referred by that provider as having legal
problems capable of resolution by nonlawyers. The referrals
would have been for "low-stakes" legal problems that did not
involve complicated legal issues. Some of those referred would
probably have been persons whose ability to handle their legal
problems was compromised by lower education levels, lack of
familiarity with the system, health problems and/or language
barriers. Others would have been persons who had the capacity
to pursue their claims on their own, with a little assistance and
support.
The following description was given of a typical problem the
LEST project might help with:
43 See, e.g., California's Sargent Shriver Civil Counsel Act (Cal. Gov. Code
§ 68650 (2011) et seq.) which establishes a fund for pilot projects for appoint-
ment of counsel "to represent low-income parties in civil matters involving
critical issues affecting basic human needs," § 68651(a), such as child custody
cases, § 68651(b)(2)(A).
44 For further description see http://www.ubalt.edu/cas/graduate-programs-
and-certificates/degree-programs/legal-and-ethical-studies/.
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A person has been unable to get a security deposit
back from the landlord. The student could assist
by doing legal research that indicated when a
landlord might or might not legally be entitled to
retain the security deposit. Based on that infor-
mation, if the person wanted to pursue the matter
further, the student could assist the person with
contacting the landlord in the manner specified by
the law. If the landlord was unresponsive, the stu-
dent could let the person know any legal options,
including the possibility of filing a small claims
court action. If the person decided to pursue a
small claims case, the student might assist the per-
son with filling out the court-provided forms to do
so. The student might also assist the person with
organizing the materials and evidence for the pres-
entation of the case in small claims court.45
The project also proposed that students could handle some
problems that might require an administrative hearing, includ-
ing, for example, the following:
A person has been denied unemployment insurance
benefits on the grounds that the person voluntarily
left work. The student could assist by doing legal
research on labor and employment law to help the
person decide whether to continue pursuing un-
employment insurance benefits. If the person be-
lieves, based on the research, that such benefits
should be paid, the student could help the person
obtain an administrative hearing and gather the
factual evidence supporting the claim for presen-
45 Letter dated Nov. 23, 2010 to the Office of the Attorney General, Educa-
tional Affairs Division (hereinafter "first letter" or "Nov. 23 letter"). This
letter and the other correspondence discussed in this Article can be found at
http://legalandethicalstudiesubalt.wordpress.com/2012/02/01/correspondence
_with agoffice/.
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tation at the hearing. If the student felt capable,
and the person desired such assistance, the student
might represent the person at the hearing, as per-
mitted by law.46
Further description provided a sense of the scope of the
LEST project as well as its limitations:
In general, students would help the referred indi-
viduals by supplying them with the relevant legal
information and explaining such information, lay-
ing out the options available and working through
possible scenarios, filling out forms and helping
with the drafting of letters, organizing evidence
for presentation and assisting with the process of
finding any missing materials, and, where legally
permissible, providing representation at adminis-
trative hearings. Students would receive training
on relevant areas of law and would be advised and
supervised by one or more attorneys. Referred in-
dividuals would receive full disclosure of what
they could and could not expect in the way of as-
sistance from the project.
Students would not do any of the following: give
suggestions to the person about what course of
conduct to take; draft pleadings for any court of
law (beyond assistance with filling out of court-
46 Id. The plan for the project also included this additional example not dis-
cussed here:
A person has fallen behind in mortgage payments and fears fore-
closure is imminent. A student could go over the lending docu-
ments with the person and help the person understand the
lender's rights and obligations. The student could also help the
person work up a budget and explore different scenarios for
mortgage payment. The student could let the person know
about any loan modification programs for which the person
might be eligible, as well as other legal and practical options
that person could consider.
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supplied forms for pro se litigants); draft docu-
ments such as contracts or wills; assist any person
with a lawsuit or administrative case involving a
large sum of money or with any legal claim that
would be appropriate to a contingency fee ar-
rangement; or assist any person with a claim that
involved a matter of criminal law or family law.
Further, the supervising attorney would refer back
to the sender any matter that in his or her judg-
ment was not appropriate for any reason for grad-
uate student assistance.47
The services would be provided free of charge; instead, partic-
ipating students would get course credit. If all went as planned,
the project would run as an internship course each semester and
could assist a steady stream of low-income people. A local legal
services provider was receptive to the idea, and plans began to
move forward toward establishing the criteria and process for
referrals. Before that could happen, however, the clinical
professors at the university's law school objected to the project
and concluded that it could not go forward because it consti-
tuted UPL.
It should be noted that the law school clinicians might have
felt ethically required to object to such a project, whatever their
views may have been about its value. A little like the directive
from Leviticus that "thou shalt not suffer a witch to live," the
rules of professional conduct for lawyers in some States man-
date that "[a] lawyer shall not assist another person in the unau-
thorized practice of law."48 Maryland currently has no such
rule, but it did at one time.49 The clinicians may have been moti-
47 Id
48 See Rule 5.5(d) in North Carolina; Rule 5.5(c) in Idaho; Rule 5.5(e) in
North Dakota.
49 Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.5 at one time stated: "A
lawyer shall not ... assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the
performance of activity that constitutes the unauthorized practice of law."
Cited in Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Hallmon, 343 Md. 390, 393
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vated in any event by an abundance of caution to avoid the ap-
pearance of a questionable collaboration. Of course, there are
alternative scenarios one can imagine - such as the clinicians
saying, "If you get accused of UPL, we will take your case as
impact litigation that could benefit poor people!" - but such al-
ternative scenarios call for more anti-establishment fervor than
is found on the average law school campus.50
The clinicians declined to withdraw their objection unless the
Maryland Attorney General's office made a determination that
the proposed activities of the project did not involve UPL. Ac-
cordingly, the LEST program sent the AG's office the descrip-
tions above of what the project proposed to do, and indicated
that the professors at the law school clinic had concluded that
the project involved UPL.51 The AG's office responded with
n.1; 681 A.2d 510 (1996). However, Maryland's current version of the rules
do not specifically impose such a requirement. See Maryland Lawyer's Rules
of Professional Conduct, Rule 5.5 Unauthorized Practice of Law; Multijuris-
dictional Practice of Law. The current rule requires lawyers to abide by the
regulations that apply to the legal profession in the jurisdiction in which the
lawyer practices, and not to assist another lawyer in evading the rules of that
jurisdiction. See 5.5(a): "A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction in
violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or assist
another in doing so." This rule is quite different from its former version. See
also Comment [1], which indicates that "Paragraph (a) applies to unautho-
rized practice of law by a lawyer, whether through the lawyer's direct action
or by the lawyer's assisting another person" (emphasis added). Further
Comment [3] states as follows: "A lawyer may provide professional advice
and instruction to nonlawyers whose employment requires knowledge of law;
for example, claims adjusters, employees of financial or commercial institu-
tions, social workers, accountants and persons employed in government
agencies. Lawyers also may assist independent nonlawyers, such as
paraprofessionals, who are authorized by the law of a jurisdiction to provide
particular law-related services. In addition, a lawyer may counsel nonlawyers
who wish to proceed pro se."
50 But see State Bar of Mich. v. Cramer, 399 Mich. 116; 249 N.W.2d 1 (1976),
where the Michigan Clinical Law Program submitted an amicus brief on be-
half of a nonlawyer found in contempt for assisting clients by preparing di-
vorce papers.
51 Supra note 45. The fact that the law school clinicians objected was in-
cluded at their specific direction.
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two memoranda 52 that agreed with the conclusion of the clini-
cians. Indeed, the memoranda concluded that virtually every as-
pect of the plan for the project involved UPL and that no
version of it could go forward. And so the experiment was
halted before it could begin.
As this experience indicates, accusations of UPL can chill or
kill lay efforts to help low-income people with their civil legal
problems. This result is not only unfortunate in terms of the
public benefit that is lost, but sometimes, as in the particular
case of the LEST project, difficult to justify in terms of applica-
ble law. Despite the conclusions of the AG's office, the pro-
posed activities of the LEST project probably did not constitute
UPL under Maryland law. However, in Maryland, as in many
States, broad or vague definitions of the practice of law make it
difficult for such projects to fight the accusation.
IV. THE LEGAL JUSTIFICATION FOR THE EXPERIMENT
Maryland's Business Occupations and Professions Law Title
10 defines the practice of law,53 forbids its unauthorized prac-
tice 54 and makes such unauthorized practice a criminal misde-
meanor. 55 The statutory definition is sufficiently broad that it
could indeed be construed to prohibit any and all of the activi-
ties in which the students in the LEST project proposed to en-
gage:
52 Memoranda dated Jan. 24, 2011 and Mar. 1, 2001 from State of Maryland,
Office of the Attorney General, Educational Affairs Division (hereinafter
"initial memorandum" or "Jan. 24 memorandum" and "followup memoran-
dum" or "Mar. 1 memorandum"). The followup memorandum from the
AG's office was in response to a second letter from the LEST program on
Feb. 9, 2011 (hereinafter "followup letter" or "Feb. 9 letter.") These memo-
randa may be found at http://legalandethicalstudiesubalt.wordpress.com/
2012/02/01/correspondence with-ag-office/.
53 Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-101(h) (2011).
54 Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-601 (2011).
55 Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. §§ 10-406, 10-606 (2011).
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(1) "Practice law" means to engage in any of the
following activities:
(i) giving legal advice;
(ii) representing another person before a unit
of the State government or of a political sub-
division; or
(iii) performing any other service that the
Court of Appeals defines as practicing law.
(2) "Practice law" includes:
(i) advising in the administration of probate
of estates of decedents in an orphans' court of
the State;
(ii) preparing an instrument that affects title
to real estate;
(iii) preparing or helping in the preparation
of any form or document that is filed in a
court or affects a case that is or may be filed in
a court; or
(iv) giving advice about a case that is or may
be filed in a court. 56
However, despite the apparent broad scope of Title 10, Mary-
land's Attorney General has in fact previously interpreted Ma-
ryland law as permitting nonlawyers to engage in activities like
those that were planned for the LEST project.
According to the Maryland AG, not all uses of the law qualify
as UPL. Rather, use of the law at higher levels of complexity is
generally necessary for an activity to be understood as involving
the practice of law. As a 2005 Maryland AG opinion remarks,
"The preparation and interpretation of legal documents and the
application of legal principles to complex problems has been
held to constitute the practice of law when it requires 'more
56 Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof § 10-101(h). Some exceptions to its
sweeping scope are set out in § 10-102 and § 10-206, but they would not have
provided the proposed LEST project with any cover.
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than the most elementary knowledge of law."' 57 Thus, as long
as the activities of the graduate students participating in the
LEST project involved the most basic legal concepts and did not
involve applying legal principles to complex problems, they
should not have been considered the practice of law.
Further, under the AG's interpretation of Maryland law, the
graduate students should have been able to offer persons with
legal problems information about their potential legal options.
A 1995 Maryland AG opinion concluded that "the simple act of
providing information about legal rights, as opposed to offering
advice about such rights and what to do about them, is not unau-
thorized." 58 Accordingly, lay persons have been recognized as
entitled to give domestic violence victims information about
their rights and remedies, including their right to seek an order
of protection,59 and social workers have been recognized as enti-
tled to give birth parents information about their statutory
rights, including their right to revoke consent to an adoption. 60
Thus, it would seem that the graduate students could have
shared and explained the results of basic legal research. For ex-
ample, a graduate student could run a search for "security de-
posit" through a legal database and print out statutes and cases
for the use of the person and help the person understand what
rights and remedies such law made available, including, for ex-
ample, the right to sue for treble damages.61
However, the students could not have helped a person decide
which rights or remedies to pursue, as the 1995 AG opinion ex-
plained that nonlawyers "must be careful to limit their activity
to the unadorned conveyance of information about what rights
57 90 Op. Atty. Gen. Md. 101, 104 (2005), citing Lukas v. Bar Ass'n of Mont-
gomery County, 35 Md. App. 442, 448, 371 A.2d 669, cert. denied, 280 Md.
733 (1977).
58 80 Op. Atty. Gen. Md. 138, 142 (1995).
59 Id. at 138.
60 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 174 (1994).
61 Real Prop. § 8-203(e)(4) (2011).
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and remedies exist." 62 Nonlawyers could not help persons de-
cide "whether to invoke any of their rights or pursue any of
their potential remedies." 63 Accordingly, as explained in a 1994
AG opinion, "the line of unauthorized practice is potentially
crossed when someone who is not a lawyer purports to give pro-
fessional advice about another person's legal situation or sug-
gests a course of conduct based on an interpretation of the law;
[but] the line is not crossed by the unadorned provision of infor-
mation."64 So long as the students gave information about the
law and did not make suggestions about how best to proceed in
applying it to a person's situation, they would not be engaged in
UPL according to Maryland AG opinions. For example, a stu-
dent who told a person that treble damages were statutorily
available for an improperly-withheld security deposit could not
tell the person that she was entitled to treble damages herself or
that she should sue to try to obtain such damages.
In addition, under the AG's interpretation of Maryland law,
the graduate students should also have been able to help per-
sons fill out court-provided forms, such as those that would have
been used to contest a withheld security deposit. For example,
the 1995 Maryland AG opinion had concluded that a nonlawyer
could "assist a [domestic violence] victim to prepare a legal
pleading or other legal document on her own behalf by defining
unfamiliar terms on a form, explaining where on a form the vic-
tim is to provide certain information, and if necessary transcrib-
ing or otherwise recording the victim's own words verbatim." 65
That opinion added that it was important that the nonlawyer not
summarize or select from the wording that the victim used, as
that would involve legal judgment. Based on this AG opinion, it
would seem that the students participating in the LEST project
62 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 142.
63 Id.
64 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 176.
65 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 139. A similar 2005 opinion that concluded that
the completion of certain standardized legal forms by a bank loan office was
not UPL. 90 Op. Atty Gen. Md. at 101.
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could have helped persons understand and fill out court-pro-
vided forms, such as those for a small claims case, as long as the
students did not make any decisions for them about how to pre-
sent their information to the court.
The graduate students could also seemingly have provided
persons with a "general orientation or overview about court
proceedings," as the 1995 AG opinion also specifically permit-
ted.66 Therefore, the students could presumably have told them
about how a courtroom generally functions, such as how the
room would be set up, who presents their case first and who gets
to ask questions when. But they could not have gone into any
kind of technical detail; they could not have "provide[d] infor-
mation about the legal aspects of judicial proceedings, such as
how to present a case, call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses,
introduce documents, and the like" as that "requires a special-
ized knowledge ordinarily beyond the purview of a layperson." 67
It should be noted that the activity of allowing nonlawyers to
provide and explain legal information, as permitted by the AG
opinions, is not without some risk. A nonlawyer explaining the
meaning of unfamiliar legal terms is not as likely as a lawyer to
give an accurate explanation. Even so innocuous an activity as a
nonlawyer handing a person a printout of a case or statute may
create the unintended and perhaps mistaken impression that the
person qualifies for the relief described in that case or statute.
But the AG has not made such risks the basis for preventing
nonlawyers from conveying and explaining basic legal informa-
tion about rights and remedies. In fact, allowing lay persons to
provide such information to domestic violence victims and birth
parents considering adoption - as Maryland AG opinions do68 -
presents risks with higher stakes than those likely to have been
created by the LEST project, which planned to avoid all matters
Volume 5, Number Z
66 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 143.
67 Id.
68 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 138; 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 174.
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where the consequences of mistake or misunderstanding were
so dire.
The LEST project did come closer to the edge of UPL insofar
as it proposed to help persons with "working through possible
scenarios" and "organizing evidence for presentation." If work-
ing through possible scenarios meant simple role-playing that al-
lowed a person to practice what she intended to do in court -
and did not involve the student in legally evaluating the ap-
proach or recommending any changes based on the achievement
of legal objectives - then such an activity would be consistent
with Maryland AG opinions. The student could, of course, have
made recommendations based on nonlegal criteria, such as
"speak more slowly." Likewise, if the organizing of materials
and evidence involved performing tasks like helping the person
put documents into labeled files and making lists of the wit-
nesses the person wanted to call and the documents she in-
tended to present, those would be mechanical functions that did
not require "specialized knowledge." 69 It would not seem that
assisting a person with logistical and practical preparations that
allowed for a more orderly presentation would cross the line
over into UPL, but rather the line would be crossed with any
suggestion to the person of how to present the case in court to
make it more legally effective.70
In terms of the activities associated with potential court cases,
such as the withheld security deposit that might lead to a small
claims case in district court, the graduate students proposed en-
gaging in activities that the AG had concluded simply did not
constitute the practice of law. However, insofar as assistance in
administrative fora was concerned, such as the example involv-
ing an unemployment insurance benefits claim, the graduate stu-
69 Mechanical or clerical functions involving the law are not unauthorized
practice. See 90 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 104-05.
70 "A lay advocate who advised a victim on how her case should be
presented or defended would violate BOP §10-206." 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md.
at 143.
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dents were proposing to engage in activities that did constitute
the practice of law. Maryland's Title 10 includes as part of the
definition of the practice of law "representing another person
before a unit of the State government or of a political subdivi-
sion."71 Further, in administrative hearings involving unemploy-
ment benefits, the rules allow the parties "to cross-examine
witnesses, to call witnesses on their own behalf, to inspect docu-
ments, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. " 72 Such
activities include those that have been described in AG opinions
as involving the practice of law.73 However, the students still
were not proposing to engage in unauthorized practice. The
rules governing administrative hearings contesting denials of un-
employment insurance benefits (similar to the rules for certain
other administrative hearings74) state that claimants may not
only be represented by an attorney but also "by any other au-
thorized agent, but the agent may not charge or accept payment
for the representation." 75 This regulation would appear to give
the graduate students legislative permission to represent claim-
ants in that forum and engage in the activities associated with
such representation.
Indeed, the Maryland AG has interpreted such legislative per-
mission as allowing nonlawyers to represent persons in adminis-
trative hearings, notwithstanding the language in Title 10. In a
1993 opinion, the AG considered the situation where a law en-
71 Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. § 10-101(h)(1)(ii).
72 COMAR 09.32.06.02 (G) (2011).
73 Unauthorized Practice of Law, supra note 58 at 143 ("how to present a
case, call witnesses, cross-examine witnesses, introduce documents, and the
like, requires a specialized knowledge ordinarily beyond the purview of a
layperson").
74 For example, persons denied Emergency Assistance to Families with Chil-
dren (the Maryland equivalent of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families)
are given regulatory permission to be represented by non-lawyers in fair
hearings under Maryland Regulations. Md. Code Regs. 07.01.04.10G (2011).
"The appellant may be represented by a lawyer, relative, friend, or other
individual." Id.
75 Md. Code Regs. 09.32.11.02F(3) (2011).
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forcement officer was authorized by statute "to be represented
by counsel or any other responsible representative of his choice"
before a hearing board.76 The AG concluded that "representa-
tion of a law enforcement officer before a hearing board un-
questionably involves tasks that are part of the practice of law.
The hearing is an evidentiary one, calling for technical knowl-
edge like the grounds for claims of privilege and skills like the
conduct of cross-examination." 77 Nonetheless, the opinion con-
cluded that the statute "authorizes a law enforcement officer to
be represented by the person of the officer's choice, even if the
representative is not at lawyer, at any stage of the . . . process
prior to court review."78 Along the same lines, a 1980 AG opin-
ion had similarly concluded that the Workers Compensation
Commission could allow nonlawyer practice before it and sug-
gested that "in . . . simpler cases, claimants (and. employers)
might well be able to pursue their claims quite competently, and
perhaps more economically, with nonlegal assistance." 79 Thus,
where such legislative permission exists, the graduate students
should have been allowed to represent claimants in administra-
tive hearings, as that would be the authorized practice of law.
It should be added that administrative fora are not as complex
in procedure and evidence as court proceedings. For example,
the claimant in an unemployment insurance benefits case does
not have to worry about formal pleadings, motion practice or
discovery, and the hearings are "conducted informally in a man-
ner to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties, and the
hearing examiner or Board of Appeals may not be bound by
common law or statutory rules as to the admissibility of evi-
dence or by technical rules of procedure." 80 To the extent that
76 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 257, 259 (1993).
77 Id. at 258.
78 Id. at 262.
79 Unauthorized Practice of Law-Workmen's Compensation Commission-
Non Lawyers May Not Represent Claimants at Commission Hearings to Give
Legal Advice on Matters Before It, 65 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. 28, 33 (1980).
80 Md. Code Regs. 09.32.11.021(1) (2011).
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assistance of nonlawyers in administrative fora involves the
practice of law, it would not be at a very high level.
Further, the practice of nonlawyers in administrative fora is
not unusual. It has been observed that
lawyers who represent clients in quasi-judicial ad-
ministrative proceedings increasingly find them-
selves sharing the market with nonlawyers.
Nowadays, lay advocates often represent workers
in grievance arbitrations, workers' compensation
proceedings, social security disability hearings, ad-
ministrative tax appeals, and the like. 81
The difference between the courts, where nonlawyers are gen-
erally not permitted to appear on behalf of parties, and adminis-
trative hearings, where nonlawyer representation sometimes
occurs, may be understood as reflecting differences between ju-
dicial and legislative functions:
[B]ecause the structure of agencies falls under leg-
islative control, the separation of powers doctrine
means that the legislature has the constitutional
authority to oust the court's otherwise exclusive
jurisdiction over the practice of law in agency pro-
ceedings. Therefore, nonlawyer representation of
persons in a state administrative proceeding can,
by legislative action, be converted to an "author-
ized" practice of law.82
Maryland's permissions for nonlawyers to represent persons in
certain administrative hearings are similar to those found in
other jurisdictions and may be based in similar theories.
81 Ted Schneyer, An Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation
of Law Practice, 30 Okla. City U.L. Rev. 559, 586 (Fall 2005). See also the
discussion in Conference, supra note 7, at pp. 1763-65.
82 Janet Morgan, Nonlawyer qualified representatives in agency proceedings -
why it's not UPL, The Florida Bar News (Sept. 15, 2006), http://www.florida
bar.org/DIVCOM/JN/jnnews0l.nsf/Artices/3891086F75F6042A852571E6006
EC973.
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In short, the graduate students participating in the proposed
LEST project should have been able to engage in its planned
slate of activities, according to Maryland law as interpreted by
the Maryland Attorney General's office and as established by
other law.
V. THE MEMORANDA FROM THE MARYLAND
ATIORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE
In finding that the proposed LEST project in its entirety con-
stituted UPL,83 the memorandum from the AG's office inter-
preted the relevant AG opinions not simply very narrowly but
omitted many of the permissions they gave. For instance, the
memorandum stated:
The [letter from the LEST program] suggests that
the proposed activities of the LEST students
would fall within the activities deemed permissible
by the Attorney General in the referenced opin-
ions. That may be the case, to the extent the stu-
dents merely referred a client to written materials
or transcribed the client's words verbatim on a
form.84
This description notably diminishes what has been identified
as permitted. According to the AG opinions, nonlawyers can
provide persons with information about legal rights and reme-
dies and are not limited to doing so by "merely referr[ing] a
client to written materials." Implicit in the AG opinions is the
idea that nonlawyers can explain legal rights and remedies to
persons, as long as the explanation does not involve more than
elementary legal knowledge. 85 Also omitted from the memoran-
83 Memorandum from Md. Att'y Gen. on Legal and Ethical Studies Out-
reach to Joseph Wood, Provost, University of Baltimore (Jan. 24, 2011).
84 Id.
85 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 142 ("the simple act of providing information
about legal rights, as opposed to offering advice about such rights and what
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dum's description is anything about allowing students to "pro-
vide a general orientation or overview about the kind of
proceeding involved," which is also permitted under AG opin-
ions.86 The AG opinions also gave nonlawyers more latitude in
the preparation of court-provided forms, allowing them to assist
persons by explaining where the information is to be placed and
"defining terms in the instructions that might be unclear."87 The
LEST program made an effort in a followup letter to convince
the assistant AG to modify the memorandum to include these
activities previously recognized as permissible, 88 but a followup
memorandum from the AG's office not only declined to do so
but also more decisively declared that the LEST project would
be "inconsistent with existing statutory authority" and therefore
its establishment was "not permitted by Maryland law."89
In general, the initial memorandum from the AG's office fol-
lowed the pattern of describing what the project proposed to do
more broadly than in the description given in the letter from the
LEST program, while failing to take account of AG opinions
and what activities they said were permitted. For example, the
memorandum said:
The examples provided . . . involve a student
meeting with a client, reviewing the problems
presented by the client, determining relevant legal
principles, providing appropriate legal informa-
tion, explaining such information in the context of
to do about them, is not unauthorized"); 90 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 104 ("[t]he
preparation and interpretation of legal documents and the application of le-
gal principles to complex problems has been held to constitute the practice of
law when it requires 'more than the most elementary knowledge of law."').
86 Id. at 143.
87 Id.
88 Feb. 9 letter, State of Maryland, Office of the Attorney General, Educa-
tional Affairs Division, http://legalandethicalstudiesubalt.wordpress.com/
2012/02/01/correspondence with-ag__office/.
89 Mar. 1 memorandum, State of Maryland, Office of the Attorney General,
Educational Affairs Division, http://legalandethicalstudiesubalt.wordpress.
com/2012/02/01/correspondence-with-ag-office/.
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the facts, and exploring potential options for pur-
suing legal rights and remedies. In my opinion,
such activities fall within the "practice of law" in
Maryland. 90
The plan for the LEST project did indeed involve graduate stu-
dents meeting with clients; providing legal information, includ-
ing information about legal rights and remedies; and explaining
the information. However, these were all activities approved in
Maryland AG opinions, as discussed previously. It is not clear
why the memorandum describes the students as "determining
relevant legal principles" or "exploring potential options for
pursuing legal rights and remedies" (emphasis added), or what it
means by these descriptions. The graduate students would not
be "determining" relevant legal principles, unless by that phrase
the memorandum means merely determining what kinds of
sources might assist the low-income person with the legal prob-
lem. A person who has a problem with a security deposit would
benefit from copies of any statutes, regulations and/or cases that
involve security deposits. It is true that the graduate student as-
sisting a person with a security deposit problem might not print
out all the cases that ever mentioned the term "security deposit"
- she might omit cases that involve commercial establishments,
for example, and stick only with cases involving residential
property. But it does not require special expertise to make that
kind of selection. As Maryland AG opinions indicate, it is not
the application of legal principles per se that is prohibited but
the application of ones that go beyond such elementary knowl-
edge of the law.91 And the graduate students would be "explor-
ing" options for pursuing legal rights and remedies only to the
extent that they would let persons know of the existence of such
rights and remedies - as permitted by the AG opinions.
90 Jan. 24 memorandum, State of Maryland, Office of the Attorney General,
Educational Affairs Division, http://legalandethicalstudiesubalt.wordpress.
com/2012/02/01/correspondence with-agoffice/.
91 90 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 104.
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With regard to the specific example of a person unable to get
a security deposit back from a landlord, the memorandum from
the AG's office remarked as follows:
[T]he issue of whether a landlord may be legally
entitled to retain a security deposit would involve
review and analysis of a lease agreement in the
context of applicable contract principles and other
relevant law. The [letter] indicates that students
would receive training on relevant areas of law
and would be advised and supervised by one or
more attorneys in handling matters for clients. In
my opinion, such activities fall within the "practice
of law" as defined by the General Assembly and
the Court of Appeals. 92
This description indicates that the graduate students would be
making a determination whether the landlord was legally enti-
tled to retain the security deposit and/or that the students would
receive training in order to make such a determination. How-
ever, neither of these conclusions follows from the description
of the LEST project's proposed activities, and that fact was
pointed out in a followup letter from the LEST program to the
AG's office. The followup letter explained that the students
would receive training in order to understand what kinds of
materials a tenant would need to consult in order to make her
own decision about which legal rights to assert. For example,
knowing that tenants need to consult their leases is something
that students would learn. But whether it makes sense to con-
sult the lease is a matter that involves the most basic legal
knowledge and certainly does not involve applying legal princi-
92 Id. The memorandum then cited as support for these conclusions: See
Atty Grievance Comm'n v. Hallmon, 343 Md. 390, 397 (1996) (focus of in-
quiry should be on whether the activity in question required legal knowledge
and skill in order to apply legal principles); Lukas v. Bar Association of
Montgomery County, 35 Md. App. 442, 448 (1997) (practice of law includes
the application of legal principles to problems of any complexity)."
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ples to problems of any complexity.93 And the example given in
the letter from the LEST program did not say that students
would themselves make any determination whether a landlord
would be entitled to retain a security deposit. Rather, it stated
that the students would assist with legal research, which would
include things like finding and printing out statutes and cases
about security deposits and giving those to the persons assisted,
to help with their decision-making about how to proceed.
Nonetheless, the assistant AG did not address this discrepancy
in her followup memorandum and did not modify her
conclusion.
Of course, persons hearing legal information may draw con-
clusions about how that information applies to their own situa-
tions, but that does not transform the activity into the giving of
legal advice.94 Indeed, as a 1994 Maryland AG opinion ex-
plained, "[c]ommerce and government would grind to a halt if
every piece of information about a statutory right or obligation
could only be communicated by a lawyer."95 Under the AG's
interpretation of Maryland law, it is the application of more
than basic legal knowledge to the particular facts of a person's
situation and the conveyance to that person of legal advice
about what course of conduct to pursue that separates what is
permissible from what is impermissible for the lay person in this
situation.
The initial memorandum from the AG's office also concluded
that the students were not permitted to assist persons with ad-
ministrative hearings, as that would "fall within the statutory
definition of the practice of law." A followup letter from the
93 90 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 104.
94 In addition, "the mere fact that the principles or rules stated ... may be
accepted by a particular [hearer] as a solution to his problem does not"
change the behavior into UPL. New York County Lawyers' Association v.
Dacey, 28 A.D.2d 161. 173 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1967) (Stevens, J.P., dissent-
ing), rev'd 21 N.Y.2d 694 ("Order reversed and petition dismissed, with costs,
on the dissenting opinion at the Appellate Division").
95 79 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 176.
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LEST program asked how that conclusion harmonized with the
provisions in Maryland law that seem to give nonlawyers the
legal authority to represent claimants in certain administrative
hearings. The followup memorandum from the AG's office reaf-
firmed the conclusion that the students would not be allowed to
provide representation in administrative hearings, and gave a ra-
tionale that is sufficiently difficult to parse that it is worth quot-
ing at length:
The provisions cited by the [letter] concern statu-
torily authorized exceptions to the general rule
that individuals who are not attorneys may not re-
present others before Maryland governmental
units. See 78 Op. Atty. Gen. 257 (a layperson may
not represent another individual where such rep-
resentation involved the practice of law without
authorization in a statute or rule of court). ...
Although they permit such assistance on an indi-
vidual basis, these provisions do not authorize the
practice of law by unauthorized individuals, nor
are they intended to authorize nonlawyers to offer
their services generally to the public or a segment
thereof ....
As a general matter, the term "authorized repre-
sentative" may be used to refer to an individual
who has been granted a power of attorney. The
power of attorney does not give the representative
the right to give advice on legal matters or appear
in court. Rather, it gives the representative the
right to act on the principal's behalf only to the
extent that the principal is permitted by law to act
through an agent. See Ross v. Chakrabarti, 194
Md. App. 526 (2010). The term may also be used
to refer to a union's appointed collective bargain-
ing representative. See., e.g., Md. Code, State
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Personnel and Pensions, §3-101. Although these
individuals may act of behalf of another individual
under certain circumstances, they do not gain the
authority to practice law without a license.
Any exception to the general rule must be statuto-
rily authorized. A state agency is not empowered
to grant such authority. See Md. Code, State
Gov't, § 10-206.1 (an agency may not grant the
right to practice law to an individual who is not
authorized to practice law) .... 96
The first and last paragraphs of this excerpt seem to recognize
that the LEST project was relying on statutory exceptions to Ti-
tle 10. It acknowledges that nonlawyers may, pursuant to such
authorization, engage in activities that would otherwise consti-
tute the practice of law, including representing persons in cer-
tain administrative proceedings, such as those involving
unemployment insurance benefits. By what mysterious al-
chemy, then, do such statutory exceptions become unavailable
to the graduate students in the LEST program to represent low-
income persons in administrative hearings?
The case cited by the memorandum, Ross v. Chakrabarti, in-
volved a nonlawyer who attempted, unsuccessfully, to use a
power of attorney as a bootstrap to enable him to function as an
attorney-at-law for another person in a court case.97 The refer-
ence to Ross seems inapposite, as he did not have the necessary
statutory exception; instead, it was concerned with representa-
tion in a court case. And while it may be true, as the memoran-
dum indicates, that some "authorized representatives" in
administrative proceedings are persons who have been granted
a power of attorney, nothing in Maryland law indicates that rep-
resentation as described in the examples cited to the AG's office
is limited to those with a power of attorney. In fact, in the 1993
96 Supra note 89.
97 194 Md. App. 526, 534 (2010).
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AG opinion cited in the memorandum and described earlier in
this Article, "representation" has been understood in its conven-
tional sense of functioning as an advocate on behalf of a party.98
The reference in the memorandum to the fact that administra-
tive agencies are not empowered to grant authority to nonlawy-
ers to practice law seems similarly inapposite. A Maryland
statute - not just a Maryland regulation - allows unemployment
benefits claimants to be represented by nonlawyers,99 and the
regulatory permission is based on a delegation of statutory au-
thority, as is generally the case with such provisions. The memo-
randum's reference to State Government § 10-206.1 (the
Maryland Administrative Procedure Act) is also of no discerni-
ble consequence0oo That statute does indeed say, as the memo-
randum indicates, that "[a]n agency may not ... grant the right
to practice law to an individual who is not authorized to practice
law." But in the same section of the statute cited, it also says,
though the memorandum does not mention it, that an agency
may not "prohibit any party from being advised or represented
at the party's own expense by an attorney or, if permitted by law,
other representative.'" 101
98 The AG concluded that "representation of a law enforcement officer
before a hearing board unquestionably involves tasks that are part of the
practice of law." 78 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 258.
99 Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. § 8-507(a) (Claimants. - In a proceeding
before a hearing examiner, a claimant may be represented by a lawyer or
another agent authorized by the claimant) and § 8-5A-08 (Representation of
parties (a) Claimants. - In a proceeding before a special examiner or the
Board of Appeals, a claimant may be represented by a lawyer or another
agent authorized by the claimant).
100 It should be noted that the Maryland APA is not applicable to many
types of administrative proceedings in Maryland, including those involving
unemployment insurance benefits claims, except for certain appeals. Md.
Code Ann. State Gov't § 10-203 (2011) establishes that "[t]his subtitle does
not apply to.. .(5) unemployment insurance claim determinations.., except
as specifically provided in Subtitle 5A of Title 8 of the Labor and Employ-
ment Article . ..."
101 Md. Code Ann. State Gov't § 10-206.1 (emphasis added).
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Thus, no law or interpretation of law cited in the followup
memorandum supports its conclusion that a graduate student
could not assist or even represent a person in an administrative
proceeding, where the law permits such assistance/representa-
tion and where a party so desires to receive it. The memoran-
dum cryptically states that although statutory authorizations
permit nonlawyer representation "on an individual basis," they
"do not authorize the practice of law by unauthorized individu-
als, nor are they intended to authorize nonlawyers to offer their
services generally to the public or a segment thereof .. .." If the
statutes allow nonlawyers to engage in representation, then it is
(under the criteria that the memorandum itself recognizes) not
the practice of law by unauthorized nonlawyers. However, the
memorandum implies that there is something impermissible
about the students offering free assistance to low-income per-
sons through referrals from a legal services provider - as that is
the means of "offering the services" to a segment of the public -
even if it would be otherwise permissible "on an individual ba-
sis." But the memorandum cites no legal support for that con-
clusion and gives no further explanation as to how something
permitted "on an individual basis" turns into something imper-
missible when done in a more organized way.
In short, the memoranda from the AG's office concluded that
all the activities the graduate students planned to engage in
were prohibited. In doing so, it cherry-picked from AG opin-
ions and took positions that were unsupported by law or that
were even contrary to legal authority - as if the goal was to pre-
vent the LEST project from going forward.
The 2005 Maryland AG opinion emphasized that the underly-
ing purpose of Title 10 is to serve as "a consumer protection
law." 10 2 If the goal of the statute is to protect the interests of the
102 90 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 106, citing See In re Application of R.G.S., 312
Md. 626, 638, 541 A.2d 977 (1988) (purpose of prohibition against unautho-
rized practice is to protect the public from "incompetent, unethical, or irre-
sponsible representation").
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consumer, then the overriding question should be whether the
low-income person who cannot afford an attorney and is unable
to secure free legal representation would be worse served by
having no assistance at all or by receiving less-than-ideal assis-
tance. There may in fact be situations where having no assis-
tance at all would indeed be preferable, such as where the
person has important interests at stake that could be irreparably
harmed by bad nonlawyer assistance. An example might be sit-
uations involving family law and criminal law, which was why
the LEST project had explicitly excepted such matters from re-
ferral. But where security deposits, unemployment benefits and
the like are concerned, free assistance by graduate students with
some training and access to legal information would seem to en-
hance the ability of low-income people to protect their legal
rights, and therefore would not frustrate the Maryland statute's
purpose of protecting consumers. Interestingly, the 1995 AG
opinion observed that "victims of domestic violence are being
'preyed upon' in ways far more threatening than the specter of
inadequate representation. Lay advocates could help victims as-
sert legal rights that they would otherwise have no means of
pursuing."'103 This observation is similarly applicable to the low-
income persons the LEST project proposed to assist.
VI. SOME LESSONS
The memoranda from the Maryland AG's office should have
concluded that most of the activities planned for the proposed
LEST project were in fact consistent with Maryland law as inter-
preted by AG opinions and as otherwise permitted by law. But,
as the law clinicians had pointed out to the LEST program, UPL
is a quagmire. The law on UPL in Maryland, as in many juris-
dictions, is sufficiently unsettled that it facilitates objections and
accusations and therefore operates as a substantial constraint on
what may be tried and what may succeed.
103 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 145.
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Accordingly, even given the existence of favorable AG opin-
ions and other law, it may be necessary for projects like the one
attempted by the LEST program to seek the endorsement of the
judicial branch in order to go forward. Maryland's Title 10 indi-
cates that the State's highest court, the Court of Appeals, may
determine what constitutes the practice of law (and presumably
what constitutes the unauthorized practice of law as well).104
Thus, a strategy for a project like this one might be to try to
convince the Maryland Court of Appeals to adopt a facilitating
rule, perhaps permitting nonlawyers to provide free assistance
to low-income persons where such assistance meets certain cri-
teria. Such a rule may not only help protect projects from accu-
sations of UPL but might even broaden the scope of the services
that such projects could provide. Because the Maryland courts
have in the past identified the judiciary as the branch entitled to
determine what constitutes the practice of law,105 getting such
judicial approval may be necessary for activities involving mat-
ters that are likely to wind up in court.
However, it is evident that the legislature also has a role in
determining the definition of the practice of law in Maryland (as
is also the case in many other jurisdictions), insofar as it has en-
acted Title 10. Further, the Maryland courts have acknowledged
this role of the legislature, 10 6 and have implied that once the leg-
104 Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ & Prof. § 10-101(h)(1)(iii).
105 Public Service Comm'n v. Hahn Transportation, Inc., 253 Md. 571, 583
(1969); see also Lukas v. Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 35 Md. App. 442,
447, cert. denied 280 Md. 733 (1977) ("The power to regulate and define what
constitutes the practice of law is vested solely in the judicial branch of gov-
ernment and not the executive or legislative").
106 The court explains the relationship as follows in Hahn Transportation:
Under our constitutional system of separation of powers, the
determination of what constitutes the practice of law and the
regulation of the practice and of its practitioners is, and essen-
tially and appropriately should be, a function of the judicial
branch of the government. In many States it has been held that
the legislative branch cannot constitutionally exercise that judi-
cial function although it may make implementing regulations.
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islature has spoken, the courts continue to have an interpretive
and interstitial role but do not trump legislative determina-
tions.107 Thus, it may also be desirable or necessary for this kind
of project to seek a statutory exception to Title 10, employing
criteria similar to those for a judicial rule. Further, where legis-
lative permission already exists for nonlawyer representation, as
with administrative proceedings, the memorandum from the
Maryland AG's office indicates that such permission still may
not be enough to allow nonlawyers to provide assistance in any
kind of organized fashion without being accused of UPL.108
Thus, a further explicit exception to that effect may need to be
legislatively adopted.
In addition to seeking statutory and court rule changes, an-
other strategy available for such projects might be to pursue im-
pact litigation. Maryland's broad interpretation of UPL could
be challenged on a number of grounds, including as violations of
the constitutional right of petition, due process and free speech.
The interpretation of UPL in the memoranda from the AG's
office could be seen as placing impermissible restrictions on the
constitutional right of low-income persons to petition the gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances.109 By analogy, the right of
"jailhouse lawyers" (prison and jail inmates) to provide legal ad-
In Maryland there has always been a comfortable accommoda-
tion in this area....
Id. at 583.
107 As the court explains in Hahn Transportation, "The fact that the legisla-
ture has occasionally spoken in specified areas on unlawful practice does not
mean that it has attempted to exclude judicial or quasi-judicial bodies from
acting at all or in other areas. .. ." Id. Accordingly, where the legislature has
spoken, the court continues to have some authority to regulate but the impli-
cation is that the role would be supplementary.
108 It has been observed that a State cannot block nonlawyers from provid-
ing representation in federal administrative fora, see Recommendations,
supra note 13 at 1764 ("States may not prevent federal agencies from electing
to permit nonlawyer practice based on the Supremacy Clause").
109 The Supreme Court has recognized that certain burdens on the right of
petition cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. In NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963) and In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978), the Court concluded
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vice and to draft legal papers for other prison and jail inmates
has already been recognized as constitutionally protected from
UPL prohibitions.1 0 Further, the murky definition of UPL in
Maryland arguably raises due process problems. The 1995 AG
opinion acknowledged that the line was hard to draw between
acceptable and unacceptable behaviors for nonlawyers, and as a
result of the "inevitably imprecise definition," courts were left
to construe the matter on a case-by-case basis."n The memo-
randa to the LEST program if anything reduces the clarity of the
situation. The Maryland law criminalizing UPL thus runs the
risk of failing to satisfy the due process requirement that the law
give people specific notice of what acts are criminally
forbidden." 2
The UPL restrictions in Maryland also may present First
Amendment free speech problems. The initial memorandum's
statement that the graduate students were only allowed to refer
persons to "written materials" and could not explain such
materials would seem to be in violation of the First Amendment
rights of both the graduate students and the persons assisted. 113
In addition, one of the things the LEST project proposed to do
was to have graduate students prepare how-to booklets that
could be generally distributed to low-income persons with legal
that the bar could not prevent lawyers from soliciting clients for impact litiga-
tion to try to bring about a change in the law.
110 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). But the Court has been re-
luctant to go further, implying in its dismissal of Hackin v. Arizona 389 U.S.
143 (1967), involving a nonlawyer assistant outside the jailhouse walls, that
the logic might not be extended to other situations.
111 80 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 141.
112 As the Supreme Court observed in Lanzetta v. New Jersey (1939), "No
one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to speculate as to the
meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to be informed as to what the
State commands or forbids." 306 U.S. 451, 453. See also Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) ("we insist that laws give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited").
113 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (there is a First
Amendment right to "receive information and ideas" as well as to convey
them).
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problems - an approach inspired by the fact that the existing
court-distributed materials seem designed mainly to assist small
business owners.'14 The initial memorandum from the Maryland
Attorney General's office indicated that "preparing general in-
formation materials for general public distribution" would be
permissible "if the student's work is reviewed and approved by
an attorney and merged into the work of the attorney," 115 echo-
ing the ethical rule that applies to paraprofessionals assisting at-
torneys in the practice of law.116 But this limitation, while
understandable as a matter of prudence, nonetheless may do too
little to respect the students' First Amendment rights to express
their views of the law. Further, the preparation of such materi-
als by nonlawyers may not constitute the practice of law at all
and thus lies outside the reach of UPL statutes. 117
Finally, it might make sense for projects like this one to seek
assistance from the agencies of the federal government con-
cerned with antitrust policy and law. Such agencies have al-
ready expressed concerns to various States (not yet including
Maryland) about the anticompetitive effect of overly restrictive
definitions of the practice of law,118 and the advocacy of the fed-
114 For example, the Maryland courts distribute a booklet entitled Small
Claims that was developed by the District Court of Maryland and Eliot M.
Wagonheim. Wagonheim is identified on the cover of the booklet as the au-
thor of The Art of Getting Paid: The Business Owner's Guide to Collecting
Debts and Managing Receivables in Maryland. Unsurprisingly, the booklet
emphasizes debt collection, rather than issues that would be more likely to
involve low-income persons, such as getting back a security deposit or ad-
dressing a consumer protection issue.
115 Supra note 90.
116 See, e.g., Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 176-77, 19 P.2d 942, 945-46
(1933).
117 See, e.g., Dacey, 28 A.D.2d at 175 ("It cannot be claimed that the publica-
tion of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amounts to legal
practice").
118 The Maryland Attorney General's office has taken note of federal over-
tures to the States in this regard. In its 2005 opinion, it remarked that
an expansive interpretation of the "practice of law" . . . might
raise antitrust issues. The United States Department of Justice
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eral agencies has evidently produced results in some jurisdic-
tions.119 However, it should be noted that seeking federal
intervention is hampered by its own set of complications.120
In short, UPL restrictions that thwart experiments like the
one attempted by the LEST program might be addressed
through various means. Of course, any and all of these ap-
proaches are likely to face opposition. Thus, attempts to experi-
ment with nonlawyer assistance to improve the access of low-
income persons to justice are likely to require concerted and
continuous effort.
VII. CONCLUSION
Given the size of the problem of access to civil justice in this
country, and the harmful effects such lack of access has on low-
income persons, it makes sense to consider the option of non-
lawyer assistance as part of the solution to the problem. While
it is also important to continue to work on ways to ensure that
the most serious legal problems are handled by lawyers, the
problem of access cannot be solved by lawyers alone. Indeed,
for the foreseeable future, increasing the number of lawyers
available to assist low-income persons with civil legal problems
is probably the least feasible approach. Figuring out ways
and the Federal Trade Commission, in joint letters to various
bar associations, have warned that statutes or rules that expan-
sively define "the practice of law" may run afoul of the federal
antitrust laws by limiting beneficial competition between law-
yers and nonlawyers with respect to certain services, without
providing a significant benefit to consumers of those services.
90 Op. Att'y Gen. Md. at 107. The AG's opinion presented this information
as part of its rationale for interpreting Title 10 more narrowly than its literal
wording would seem to require.
119 See discussion in Part 11 of Montana.
120 Under the doctrine articulated in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352
(1943), certain kinds of State action, including State regulation of the bar, are
not covered by the Sherman Act. See Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S.
350, 359 (1977); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984).
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around the problem represented by UPL restrictions is thus es-
sential to ensuring that experiments with nonlawyer assistance
are tried and real strides are taken to improve access to justice.
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